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STOPPING STALKERS: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF ANTI-STALKING
STATUTES
For the last few months of her life, Regina Butkowski's days
were filled with fear.1 An acquaintance from a health club, Pernell
Jefferson, had become obsessed with her. Jefferson repeatedly
called, threatening to kill her if she did not date him.' At one point
she was abducted, but then released. Finally, Jefferson kidnapped
Regina, shot her in the head, and abandoned her dead body in a
river bed, after dousing it with gasoline and setting it on fire.'
For Regina Butkowski, and thousands like her,6 the justice
system in America has been wholly inadequate in protecting vic-
tims' rights to life and privacy.6 In too many cases, law enforce-
ment agencies and the judicial system have lacked legal mecha-
nisms for stopping potential wrongdoers before they cause serious
harm.7 However, in response to increased media attention and
public awareness of what is commonly referred to as "stalking,"
lawmakers in thirty-nine states9 have recently enacted legislation
1 See John W. Anderson, Virginia Targets Stalkers: Bills Would Outlaw Repeated,
Fear-Inducing Harassment, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1992, at D1.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Id. Ms. Butkowski's body was not found for eight months. Id.
I See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (stalking occurs with alarming
frequency).
6 See Mimi Hall, States Take Aim at Stopping Stalkers, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 1992, at
3A (reporting that restraining orders generally fail in deterring stalkers); Constance L. Hays,
If That Man Is Following Her, Connecticut Is Going to Follow Him, N.Y. TaEs, June 5,
1992, at B1 (stating that stalker terrorized victim, yet did nothing illegal).
7 See infra note 55 and accompanying text (describing failed attempts by stalking vic-
tims to secure legal assistance).
8 See Elizabeth Ross, Problem of Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1992, Section: The U.S., at 6 (asserting that stalking laws are in
response to growing awareness of domestic abuse). But see Cheryl Laird, Stalking; Laws
Confront Obsession That Turns Fear into Terror and Brings Nightmares to Life, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May 17, 1992, Lifestyle Section, at 1 (noting that some experts claim growing
interest in stalking is due to increase in actual incidents, while others claim society is merely
discussing it more).
9 See infra Table 1 (identifying each state stalking statute and its constituent ele-
ments); see also 1992 Ala. Acts 92-675; 1993 Ark. Act 379; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West
1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237 (Reg. Sess.);
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aimed at breaking this pattern of violence.10
The birth of these new laws has not been without contro-
versy.11 Anti-stalking statutes play host to a litany of competing
rights and policies.'2 Questions as to the scope and nature of the
problem, the proper response, and the necessity of such laws are
issues that cannot easily be resolved. In order to effectively protect
victims, stalking laws must be broad in scope and have substantial
penalties.' 3 On the other hand, such laws must also be sufficiently
narrow to pass constitutional muster. 4 The amorphous nature of
the problem, however, creates difficulty in reaching an appropriate
68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-208; 1993 Ga. Laws 560; 1992 Haw. Sess.
Laws 292; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1992); 1992 Ill. Laws 871 (West); 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 97
(West); 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2025 (West); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 298; 1992 Ky.
Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 443 (Baldwin); 1992 La. Acts 80; 1993 Md. Laws Ch. 206; MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.411 h & i (West
1993); 1992 Miss. Laws Ch. 532; 1993 Mont. Laws Ch. 292; 1992 Neb. Laws L.B. 1098; 1992
N.J. S.B. 256, 205th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (enacted); 1993 N.M. Laws Ch. 86; 1992 N.Y.
Laws 345; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1992); 1992 Ohio Laws 234; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1173 (West 1993); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 92-201; 1992 S.C. Acts 417; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-19A (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1992); 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch.
10 (Vernon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie
1992); 1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 186 (West); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992); 1992 Wis. A.B.
668, 90th Legis. Sess. (enacted); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 92.
10 See Anti-Stalking Laws Top List of New Legislation, WASH. POST, June 29, 1992
(asserting that stalking statutes are part of rapidly spreading movement to protect women
from obsessed men); World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC News television
broadcast, Aug. 11, 1992) (stating that stalking laws are "an unprecedented effort," sweep-
ing country, to prevent violence).
" See Hall, supra note 6, at 3A (stalking laws are too vague and could possibly
criminalize proper conduct); Hays, supra note 6, at B1 (anti-stalking statutes are finding
support among victims' rights advocates, but are criticized by civil libertarians); Maria Pu-
ente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking: But Some Experts Say Measures Are
Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A (claiming Florida's statute is too broad, while West
Virginia's is too narrow; other laws may be either unconstitutional or so cautious they are
ineffective).
12 See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text (discussing merits and possible draw-
backs of stalking statutes).
" See Puente, supra note 11.
" See Puente, supra note 11 ("In their haste to respond, the states may adopt some-
thing so broad as to be unconstitutional, or so narrow as to be virtually meaningless .... "
(quoting United States Senator William Cohen of Maine)); see also 138 CONG. REc. 89527
(daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (pending federal legislation addressing
stalking). Senator Cohen is the sponsor of a bill calling for the Attorney General and the
Director of the National Institute of Justice to: first, evaluate anti-stalking legislation and
proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states; second, develop model anti-stalking legisla-
tion that is constitutional and enforceable; third, prepare and disseminate their findings to
state authorities; and fourth, within a year of enactment of the act, report to Congress the
findings and the need for further action by the federal government. Id. The bill is currently
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 138 CONG. REc. D1226 (1992).
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balance. 5
This Note will focus on the policy underpinnings, constitution-
ality, and effectiveness of the stalking statutes and how to best bal-
ance these concerns. Part One reviews the policy considerations
underlying stalking legislation. Part Two discusses the constitu-
tionality of these statutes, while Part Three analyzes their relative
effectiveness. Finally, Part Four of this Note will conclude with a
model statute that draws from the best features of the various
anti-stalking laws.
I. QUESTIONS OF POLICY
A variety of policy issues surround the stalking enigma. Issues
such as defining the proscribed conduct, deciding which persons
should be protected, why previous remedies have been ineffective,
and whether stalking legislation will be any more effective must be
resolved if such legislation is to have the desired result.
A. Defining the Problem
Although stalking has received widespread media attention, 6
no comprehensive study of the phenomenon has yet been com-
pleted, and, consequently, no one knows the full dimensions of the
11 See infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty as to extent of
stalking and what conduct should be defined as stalking).
16 Stalking has been featured on several television programs. See, e.g., 48 Hours (CBS
News television broadcast, Mar. 4, 1992); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Mar.
2, 1992); Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992). The topic has also been
widely covered in print. See, e.g., Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK,
July 13, 1992, at 60; Puente, supra note 11; Mike Tharp, In the Mind of a Stalker, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 17, 1992, at 28. There have also been numerous articles in re-
gional and local newspapers on the subject of stalking. In the first six months of 1992 the
Boston Globe ran six stories that described stalking incidents. See, e.g., John Ellement, Po-
lice Arrest Boston Man, 18, for Violating State Stalking Law, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28,
1992, Metro/Region, at 75; Patricia Nealon, Terrors of Stalking Relived; Women Accuse
Ex-boyfriends, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 1992, Metro/Region, at 1. The Houston Chronicle
ran two during the same time period, see Rene Lynch, "Stalking Law" Adds Punishment
Muscle in Harassment Cases, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1992, at 2; Kristin N. Sullivan, Wo-
man's Case Illustrates Need for State Stalking Law, Some Say, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 19,
1992, at 26, while the Los Angeles Times ran eight. See, e.g., Josh Meyer, Man Held in
Stalking of Pop Singer Janet Jackson, L.A. TimEs, June 25, 1992, at B3; Janet Rae-Dupree,
Man Sentenced to 3 Years Under 'Stalking' Law, L.A. TimES, Jan. 17, 1992, at B5. Stalking
has also been a convenient vehicle for Hollywood. Recent motion pictures such as CAPE
FEAR, FATAL ArRACTION, and SLEEPING wrrH THE ENEMY have all centered around a stalk-
ing. See Beck et al., supra.
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problem. 17 Some projections have, however, been made as to the
prevalence of stalking in America. A leading forensic psychiatrist
and expert on behavioral sciences, Dr. Parker Dietz,", conserva-
tively estimates that there are 200,000 stalkers on the streets to-
day19 and that one in every twenty women in the United States
will be stalked at some point in her life.20 In addition, United Press
International reports that an estimated 4,600 cases were reported
in 1991.21 Notwithstanding the paucity of significant studies, stalk-
ing is widely perceived to be a common problem.22
Stalkers, as a group, have been found to manifest a variety of
17 See Beck et al., supra note 16 ("[N]o one can say how widespread a problem stalking
is-mainly because it has never been a crime category before."); John W. Fountain & Jo-
seph Kirby, Stalking Victims Find Laws Are Little Help, CHI. TinB., Aug. 5, 1992, at D1
("[T]here are apparently no statistics on the number of women who become stalking vic-
tims."); Hall, supra note 6 ("Although no statistics track how many people are stalked,
victims' groups say enormous numbers of people, mostly women, are harassed.").
18 Dr. Dietz has written extensively on stalking and stalking-related topics. See, e.g.,
Parker E. Dietz et al., Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to Hollywood Ce-
lebrities, J. OF FORENSIC Sci., Jan. 1991, at 185 [hereinafter Letters to Celebrities]; Parker
E. Dietz et al., Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to Members of the
United States Congress, J. OF FORENSIC SCI., Sept. 1991, at 1445 [hereinafter Letters to
Members of Congress]; see also Scott Hays, Stalking Fame; Psychology: A Seven-Year
Study of Letters from Obsessed Fans Gives a Newport Beach Expert Some Clues into
Troubled Minds, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1990, at El (stating that purpose of Dietz's study was
to identify characteristics that could predict "approach"). As of this writing, Dr. Dietz has
completed the only reliable studies of behavior relating to stalking in two widely-cited
works, Letters to Celebrities and Letters to Members of Congress. In both, letters to indi-
vidual members of each group were analyzed primarily to determine the risks that the
writer posed to the recipient and to identify the indicators that predict approach. See gen-
erally Judith Colp, Hinckley to Dahmer, Celebrity Expert Jets from Case to Famous Case,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1992, at E2 (stating that Dr. Dietz has also testified as psychiatric
expert in several widely publicized cases including trials of John Hinckley, Jr., Jeffrey
Dahmer, and socialite Betty Broderick).
19 Telephone Interview with Parker E. Dietz (Oct. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with
Dietz]. In a telephone interview with the author, Dr. Dietz explained that the number of
stalkers will vary widely according to the definition applied. Dr. Dietz stated that this esti-
mate of 200,000 was based on a definition of stalking as an "unwanted pursuit of a person to
whom one is not related .... extending over a period of time greater than six months, but
not necessarily involving an approach and not necessarily involving malicious intent."
20 See Puente, supra note 11 (quoting Dr. Dietz).
21 Stalker, UPI, July 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
22 See generally Hall, supra note 6 ("[E]normous numbers of people, mostly women,
are harassed."); Sue Horton, Secret Admirer: Stalking as a Hate Crime, L.A. WKLY., Sept.
18-24, 1992 (stalking occurs frequently, and most commonly to ordinary, non-celebrity
members of society); Ill. Senator Sponsors "Stalker" Bill, CRIME VICTIMS DIG., Nov. 1991,
at 8 ("Police and women's groups say it's a common problem: a woman is fearful because an
angry ex-husband or boyfriend is shadowing her at home or at work, sometimes threatening
to kill her."); Puente, supra note 11 ("It's an incredibly prevalent problem.").
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psychological disorders including erotomania, 3 schizophrenia, 24
and others.25 There is, however, no discernible pattern of stalking
or of the stalker "type."2 6 Stalking also occurs in a wide variety of
contexts, 7 from situations in which the victim and stalker formerly
had an intimate, personal relationship, to cases in which the
stalker was a complete stranger to the victim. The common thread
is that the offenders, in most cases, use similar techniques to ter-
rorize their prey."' Consequently, stalking can be described as a
type of anti-social behavior, occurring in several contexts and per-
petrated by individuals with a variety of behavioral types featuring
some similarities, but not otherwise following a common pattern.2 9
2'3 See Puente, supra note 11 (citing study by Los Angeles Police Department's Threat
Management Unit); see also Stuart Cosgrove, Erotomania, NEW STATESMAN & SoC'Y, July
27, 1990, at 31 (erotomaniacal stalking of celebrities is by-product of media exposure). Ero-
tomania, or De Clerembaut's Syndrome, was first studied in G.G. De Clerembaut's seminal
work, Les Psychoses Passionelles (1942). According to De Clerembaut, erotomania victims
share five basic characteristics: "[a] difficult and psychologically troubled domestic environ-
ment ... a domineering parent; a transference of love and devotional interest to a person
who is unobtainable; a history of dramatic demonstrations of love, including threats of sui-
cide, dangerous and very public stunts and sometimes physical attacks ... "and, in extreme
conditions, an inversion of rejection into gestures of love. See Cosgrove, supra.
24 See Letters to Celebrities, supra note 18 (stating that high percentage of subjects
could be diagnosed as schizophrenic); Interview with Dietz, supra note 19 (same). In a tele-
phone interview with the author, Dr. Dietz stated that, based on his studies of inappropriate
letters, it was estimated that approximately 50% of the subjects were schizophrenic. Dr.
Dietz also pointed out that, whereas celebrity stalkers generally suffer from some serious
mental illness, stalkers of private citizens usually exhibit lesser personality disorders. In
brief, Dr. Dietz believed that it is "sicker to persist in the belief that a star loves you than
[to think] that an ex-spouse still loves you." Id.
25 See Tharp, supra note 16 ("Stalkers range from coldblooded killers to lovesick teens,
huddled beneath an umbrella of psychological syndromes: paranoia, erotomania, manic de-
pression and schizophrenia."); John C. Lane, Threat Management Fills Void in Police Ser-
vices, THE POLICE CHIEF, August 1992, at 27 (describing stalkers of celebrities as love-ob-
sessed, obsessive-compulsive, erotomaniacal, and schizophrenic).
26 See Tharp, supra note 16 (citing one study that identified indicators, but could dis-
cern no specific type).
27 See Puente, supra note 11. The Los Angeles Police Department's Threat Manage-
ment Unit has categorized the victims of stalking into four distinct groups: 38% of stalking
victims are ordinary citizens; 32% are lesser-known entertainment figures; 17% are highly
recognizable celebrities; and 13% are former employers or other professionals. It should be
pointed out, however, that these statistics are based on data from the Los Angeles area and
that, because of a high concentration of celebrities and entertainment figures, they may not
reflect nation-wide figures.
2'8 See, e.g., Horton, supra note 22; Puente, supra note 11; Tharp, supra note 16.
29 See Tharp, supra note 16. The research of Gavin de Becker, an expert in anti-stalk-
ing security, has identified several characteristics common to stalkers. Culled from letters
and behavioral records, these characteristics include "references to obsessive love, weapons,
death, suicide, religious themes and a common destiny with the [victim]." Id. at xx. Never-
1993]
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Designing one law to protect all victims, cover all offenders, yet
still remain constitutional is an ambitious undertaking.
Another aspect of the definitional problem is that anti-stalk-
ing legislation criminalizes conduct that has, until now, never been
expressly proscribed. 31 The common law, with its emphasis on in-
dividual liberty and autonomy,32 provides no useful paradigm for
deciding the contours of the crime. Stalking, though it has long
been observed,33 has only recently been perceived as sufficiently se-
rious to warrant proscription. 4 The law is now seeking to fill this
gap, but the task is complicated by the difficulty in defining the
problem.3 5
theless, there is no stalker profile. Id. Many stalkers share certain behavioral traits: an inter-
est in the media, an inability to develop meaningful relationships, and a desire for recogni-
tion and attention. Id.
30 Cf. 138 CONG. REC. S9527 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statements of Sen. Cohen)
(describing stalking of former intimates, complete strangers, and celebrities, and expressing
concern about whether current stalking legislation is constitutional).
" See, e.g., Hays, supra note 6 (stating that stalking victim in Connecticut had no legal
recourse to stop her pursuer); Laird, supra note 8 (Texas; same); see also Andrea King,
Obsessed Fans and Stalkers: How the System Fought Back, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 22, 1991
(explaining that prior to passage of anti-stalking law in 1990, California used variety of laws
in stop-gap approach to combating stalking).
32 Cf. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can
Orders of Protection Deflect Deshaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1320-22 (1990) (positing
that framework of traditional jurisprudence, based upon idea that state government is po-
tential threat to individualism, is irrelevant in context of victimization, which requires
greater state involvement and protection).
" See Horton, supra note 22 (case of 53-year-old French woman who became convinced
she was the inamorata of King George V of England and persisted by waiting outside Buck-
ingham Palace for signs of King's affection) (citing De Clerembaut's Les Psychoses
Passionelles).
34 See Rosalind Resnick, States Enact 'Stalking' Laws; California Takes Lead, NAT'L
L.J., May 11, 1992, at 3. Deborah P. Kelly, the chair of the American Bar Association's
Committee on Victims, stated that "within the last decade, legislators' attention to the
plight of crime victims has been heightened." Id. "Before, there wasn't anything illegal
about stalking and yet people were being murdered." Id.
35 Cf. M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment; An exer-
cise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1989) (explaining difficulties
inherent in drafting telephone harassment statutes).
A legislator preparing to draft a law regulating expression naturally looks to the
courts for guidance, seeking to avoid categories of speech already determined by
the courts to be constitutionally-protected. He knows that a law capable of intrud-
ing on one of those categories may be held overbroad. Yet in the telephonic ex-
pression context, no court has defined the parameters of such a category; conse-
quently, the legislator does not know the limits placed on his proscriptive powers
by the First Amendment. He must beware of crossing a border whose existence
the courts have posited, but whose location they have not yet identified.
Id. It is suggested that similar constraints will restrict stalking legislation.
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Moreover, the conduct associated with the crime-the act of
following another person-is often indistinguishable from perfectly
legal conduct. 8 Proscription of such conduct validly raises con-
cerns about misapplication of the law or abusive and discrimina-
tory enforcement.37 One way of minimizing such abuses is to nar-
An enlightening example of the problems associated with drafting broad and inclusive
statutes to fill an indeterminate gap in the law is MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) concerning harassment:
§ 250.4. Harassment. A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to
harass another, he: (1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate com-
munication; or (2) insilts, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to pro-
voke violent or disorderly response; or (3) makes repeated communications anony-
mously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or (5) engages in any other course of
alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor.
Comment
1. Background. Section 250.4 deals with a variety of behavior that may harass
another but that otherwise does not constitute a criminal offense. The section de-
clares that one who engages in designated misconduct with purpose to harass an-
other is guilty of a petty misdemeanor... 5. Subsection (5); Other Harassment.
Subsection (5) reaches one who, with purpose to harass another, "engages in any
other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor." This
provision acts as a hedge against the ingenuity of human beings in finding ways to
bedevil their fellows.... In line with its purpose to proscribe forms of harassment
that cannot be anticipated and precisely stated in advance, Subsection (5) is
worded in a designedly general way.
Id.
As is evident, the statute, as a whole, and subsection (5) in particular, is remarkably
broad. This statute ambitiously undertook to proscribe a wide variety of anti-social behavior
that, with possible exceptions of subsections (2) and (4), had not previously been considered
illegal, but merely socially distasteful. As opposed to the rest of the model statute, subsec-
tion (5), not surprisingly, was not accepted by the states as favorably as other sections of the
statute. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt. 5 (asserting that although other sections of model
code received "overwhelming support," section has not). It is submitted that the drafters'
uncertainty with respect to the specific conduct to be barred, and the resultant general and
vague wording, may have represented a contributing factor in the states' failure to enact the
model in its entirety. See id.
36 Cf. Pamela Sirking, The Evanescent Actus Reus Requirement: California Penal
Code § 647(D)-Criminal Liability for "Loitering with Intent . . ." Is Punishment for
Merely Thinking Certain Thoughts While Loitering Constitutional?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 165
(1990) (stating that loitering statutes fail to specify prohibited conduct; prosecuting on pres-
ence of concurring mens rea, therefore, impermissibly creates thought crime). Sirking's ob-
servation seems to apply to stalking statutes. If the prohibited conduct is identical to legal
behavior, the determinate factor of the crime is the mental state of the criminal, and this, it
is suggested, creates a "thought" crime.
37 See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (criticizing stalking laws as highly sus-
ceptible to abuse). It is submitted that stalking and loitering statutes are similar in this
regard. See generally Jordan Berns, Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the
Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 717 (1989) (stating that Constitution
mandates that courts limit police discretion in enforcing loitering laws); Kevin G. Lauri,
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row the scope of the statute."s But narrowing the scope will, in
turn, exclude offenders.39 A careful balance must thus be achieved:
stalking statutes must be defined as broadly as possible to maxi-
mize victim protection, but narrowly enough to prevent serious
abuse.
B. Primary Focus-Curbing Domestic Violence
Stalking is largely defined by the relationship between the vic-
tim and the offender. Stalking victims can be separated into four
general categories: 40 victims who are celebrities, 41 victims who do
not know their stalkers,42 victims who are co-workers or acquaint-
ances of their stalkersa and victims who are former spouses or
Comment, Loitering Permitted: A Valid Weapon Is Taken from the Arsenal that Combats
Crime in Transportation Facilities, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1033 (1989) (positing that New York
courts were correct in striking down state's loitering statute because it granted police "un-
fettered discretion" in their response).
' See supra notes 145-49, 171-74 (various provisions have been employed to narrow
scope of stalking statutes).
11 See supra notes 150-51, 171-74 (additional elements in crime have effect of excluding
stalkers).
"I See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (description of four categories). But see
Ross, supra note 8 (alternate analysis). A Los Angeles city attorney, Alana Bowman, states
that most stalking cases fall into one of three categories: domestic violence, work-place har-
assment, or stalking of a famous person such as a movie star. Id. It is submitted that Bow-
man's analysis omits another significant group, victims who are noncelebrities and are total
strangers to their pursuers. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing stalking by
strangers).
41 See Daniel Goleman, Dangerous Delusions: When Fans Are a Threat, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 31, 1989, at C1. "'Since 1968 there have been as many injurious attacks on public
figures by mentally disordered people who gave some sort of warning as there were in the
preceding 175 years.' "Id. (quoting Dr. Dietz). Cases of celebrity stalking have recently been
the subject of considerable media coverage. See, e.g., Guns and Roses: The Whole Chilling
Truth Behind the Deadly Stalking of Rebecca Schaeffer and Some of Hollywood's Biggest
Stars, L.A. MAG., Feb. 1990 [hereinafter Guns and Roses] (describing stalking of Schaeffer,
Michael J. Fox, Olivia Newton-John, and others); Fred Leeson, Inside the Mind of a Star
Stalker, CRIMEBEAT, Apr. 1992, at 21 (chronicling stalking and murder of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer); Tharp, supra note 16 (same). Numerous celebrities have been the targets of
stalkers; Michael J. Fox, Michael Landon, David Letterman, Olivia Newton-John, Cher,
Sheena Easton, Justine Bateman, Tiffany, and Johnny Carson are some of the more publi-
cized cases. Guns and Roses, supra. Actress Theresa Saldana survived a knife attack by a
stalker in 1982. Leeson, supra. Actress Rebecca Schaeffer was killed by a schizophrenic
stalker in 1989. Id. In April 1991, a female stalker, armed with a semiautomatic rifle, broke
into the home of actress Sharon Gless and then proceeded to keep police at bay for seven
hours. Id. Gless, who fortunately was not at home at the time, had met the stalker on sev-
eral occasions. Id.
42 See, e.g., Hays, supra note 6 (citing case of 15-year-old stalked by complete
stranger).
"' See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 16 (girl and boyfriend stalked and killed by obsessed
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lovers of their stalkers. 44 This last area of stalking-believed to be
the largest-is the primary focus of legislative action.45
Domestic violence is increasing in America,46 with an esti-
mated three to four million women battered each year.47 Domestic
beating is the leading cause of injury among American women.48
One half of all women killed in the United States are killed by
their husbands or boyfriends,49 and as many as ninety percent of
them are stalked first.5 0
Recent attention on victims' and women's rights has been one
acquaintance); Hall, supra note 6 (describing stalking by former high school classmate);
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (woman stalked and killed by acquaintance).
41 See Joseph Kirby, Stalking Law Sends a New Signal, CH. TRm., Aug. 13, 1992, at
C1 (citing case of woman stalked by ex-husband); Donald B. Ayers, Stalking Victims Tell
Committee Their Stories, UPI, Apr. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
(citing two cases of husbands stalking estranged wives).
45 See Ill. Senator Sponsors "Stalker" Bill, supra note 22, at 9 (stating that proposed
stalking statute was in response to several incidents of domestic violence stalking); Ross,
supra note 8 (stating that antistalking laws were passed in response to growing awareness of
domestic abuse as serious crime); Bill Would Make Stalking a Crime, UPI, Jan. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing stalking bill as "designed mainly to
provide protection for women who are stalked by jilted boyfriends or former husbands, be-
havior that can lead to physical attacks").
" See Peggy Lowe, Bracelet Designed to Deter Stalkers of Women, L.A. TIas, Sept.
27, 1992, at B6 (stating that increased reports of domestic violence have authorities experi-
menting with alternate solutions); Quincy Court vs. Domestic Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2,
1992, at 18 ("The rising tide of domestic violence has lawmakers scrambling."). But see
ELIZABETH PLEcK, DoiEsTc TYRANNY 3 (1987) (indicating debate over actual cause of in-
crease in reports of domestic violence). "Current statistics on the incidence of family vio-
lence show that the number of reports have risen dramatically, but it is difficult to know if
this is the result of heightened social awareness or an actual increase in domestic abuse.
Historical data are even less reliable." Id. at 3.
47 See Nancy K. Sugg & Thomas Inui, Primary Care Physicians' Response to Domestic
Violence, JAMA, June 17, 1992, at 3157.
In a nationwide random sample of couples, 28% were found to have experienced
violence at some point in their history. Furthermore, 3.8% of women living in
couples had experienced severe violence in the year of the study. When extrapo-
lated to the general population, this represents 1.8 million women per year being
battered; if divorced or separated women are included, this estimate is 3 to 4 mil-
lion women per year.
Id.
4' Teri Randall, Domestic Violence Intervention Calls for More Than Treating Inju-
ries, JAMA, Aug. 22, 1990, at 939 (citing E. D. Stark & A. Flitcraft, Violence Among Inti-
mates: An Epidemiological Review, in HANDBOOK OF FAMImY VIOLENCE 293-318 (V. N. Has-
selt et al. eds., 1988)).
4' See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Violence Against
Women, JAMA, June 17, 1992, at 3184 (over half of women murdered in United States are
killed by current or former male partners).
11 Beck et al., supra note 16, at 61 (quoting Ruth Micklem, co-director of Virginians
Against Domestic Violence).
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of the major factors prompting anti-stalking legislation.5 1 Legisla-
tive activity focusing on domestic violence is widespread and grow-
ing.5 2 Anti-stalking laws are seen as a component in the struggle to
secure greater protection for women in society.5 s
C. The Shortcomings of Traditional Remedies
The primary concern of anti-stalking legislation is to stop
threatening and harassing conduct before it escalates into vio-
lence.54 Generally, this is in response to the ineffectiveness of tradi-
tional remedies. 5 Civil actions for monetary damages, usually
1 See Ross, supra note 8 (growing awareness of domestic violence has resulted in anti-
stalking laws).
52 See S. 3271, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This bill, called the Sexual Assault Preven-
tion Act of 1992, includes the following section entitled Domestic Violence and Offenses
Against the Family:
Sec. 208. Anti-stalking Legislation
(A) findings and declarations.-The congress finds and declares that-
(1) the criminal act of stalking other persons is a problem of deep concern;
(2) previously available legal recourses against stalking, such as restraining orders,
have proven to be inadequate;
(3) anti-stalking legislation has been enacted or proposed in several states;
(4) the constitutionality of state anti-stalking statutes may be challenged by de-
fendants; and
(5) the congress has an interest in assisting the states in enacting anti-stalking
legislation that is effective, constitutional, and enforceable.
(B) evaluation and report.-The attorney general shall--
(1) evaluate enacted and proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states;
(2) develop model anti-stalking legislation that is effective, constitutional, and
enforceable;
(3) prepare and disseminate to state authorities the findings of the evaluation
under this subsection and the model anti-stalking legislation; and
(4) not less than 1 year after the date of enactment of this act, submit a report to
the congress containing the findings of the evaluation and the model legislation,
and any recommendations the attorney general may have concerning the need for
or appropriateness of further action by the federal government.
Id.
53 See Anti-Stalking Laws Top List of New Legislation, WAsH. POST, June 6, 1992
("Laws against 'stalking' take effect in several states this week as part of a rapidly spreading
effort to protect women from the terrifying advances of obsessed men."); Helen Dewar, Sen-
ate's New Sensitivity; Message of Anger Spurs Women's Agenda, WASH. POST, Sept. 24,
1992, at Al (stating that heightened interest in women's issues have increased number of
Senate bills on topics such as stalking and other forms of violence directed at women);
Fountain & Kirby, supra note 17, at DI ("In an attempt to offer women more protection,
lawmakers across the country have enacted anti-stalking laws.").
" See Beck et al., supra note 16 (stating that new laws attempt to halt pattern of
threats and harassment that often precedes violent acts).
" See Fountain & Kirby, supra note 17 (stating ineffectiveness of court orders as ra-
tionale for lawmakers to enact stalking legislation); Laird, supra note 8 (quoting Texas
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based on tort theories, such as invasion of privacy or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, are clearly inappropriate in stalk-
ing cases.5 s Moreover, in many cases the pecuniary relief granted in
a civil court does not deter future offensive conduct 57 and is inade-
quate to repair the damage.18 Finally, the usual delay in civil
courts precludes such solutions from being effective in arresting
violence. 59
Equitable remedies, such as temporary restraining orders
("TROs"), stay away orders, and permanent injunctions have been
the most common6 ° and effective forms of preventing harassing be-
havior,61 primarily because they are more flexible 62 and expedi-
judge as stating that restraining orders are cumbersome and state should bear burden of
prosecuting stalking); Ross, supra note 8 (stating that Pennsylvania stalking bill was in re-
sponse to murder of woman who had exhausted all legal remedies). See generally EVE S.
BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DoMEs=c VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 119
(1990). "Grau, Fagan, and Wexler (1985) interviewed 270 recipients of TROs. They found
that the orders were generally ineffective in either reducing the rate or severity of abuse by
serious abusers. Instead, they reported that 60% of the victims studied were abused again
regardless of the presence of a restraining order." Id.
56 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 55 (pecuniary awards are not appropriate in
domestic violence contexts); see Andrea Robinson, A Remedial Approach to Harassment,
70 VA. L. REV. 507, 513 (1984) (monetary awards are clumsy and inappropriate for harass-
ment); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117
(5th ed. 1984). The tort of unreasonable intrusion is part of the invasion of privacy doctrine.
It prohibits intrusion upon another's physical solitude or seclusion, and requires something
prying in nature that would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. While this
does seem appropriate to stalking, it has been deemed inapplicable to invasions on public
streets or in public places, where plaintiff has no legal right to be alone. See, e.g., Forster v.
Manchester, 189 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1963) (holding that plaintiff could not recover on invasion of
privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress theories because defendant's actions
were reasonable).
7 See Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of
Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 727, 735 (1988) ("[T]he assessment of damages will have absolutely no deterrent effect
on insolvent criminal offenders."). It is suggested that such a result would also occur if the
offender were sufficiently motivated or was indifferent to monetary penalties.
" See Robinson, supra note 56, at 514 (stating that money damages cannot repair dig-
nitary injury or adequately compensate for emotional suffering).
19 Cf. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 55. "Due to general case overload, most civil
actions take an exceptionally long time to hear, often in excess of five years in major urban
areas. Hence, they often become irrelevant and are of little assistance to domestic dispu-
tants." Id.
10 Cf. Fountain & Kirby, supra note 17 (stating that court orders are most common
legal recourse to domestic violence).
" See Robinson, supra note 56, at 513 (claiming that injunctive litigation is most effec-
tive relief where compensatory damages prove unsatisfactory).
62 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 113.
[T]he courts have far wider discretion to fashion injunctive relief, unlike the rela-
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tious65 than tort remedies. In many cases, however, these remedies
are considered ineffectual,64 "cumbersome,"" or merely "piece[s]
of paper. "66 Law enforcement agencies have limited resources and
often can provide only nominal assistance for enforcing such mea-
sures.6 7 Also, insensitivity towards domestic violence and inade-
quate discretion on the part of law enforcement officers are well
documented and have done much to undermine the effectiveness
of provisional remedies. 8
The procedural hurdles imposed upon victims/plaintiffs pose
another obstacle to successful prosecution of civil claims. The pro-
tively strict sentencing restraints in criminal cases. Thirty-eight states have ex-
pressly given judges the authority to grant "any constitutionally warranted relief
that is available" (Finn, 1989). For example, courts often issue the following pro-
tective orders in domestic violence cases: Orders to refrain from other physical or
psychological abuse or even to restrict any contact with an alleged victim; orders
to vacate a domicile within a certain period or to allow the alleged victim the
exclusive use of certain personal property, such as a car, even though title to the
property is in the name of the restrained party; orders to enter counseling ....
This list should not, however, be viewed as exhaustive. A court's power to restrain
improper conduct is not limited to any particular remedy, but is intended to be
applied to the specific situation. The order may be fashioned to prevent circum-
stances that have previously led to violence.
Id.
6 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA supra note 55, at 113. "If the matter is urgent, such as the
threat of immediate violence, 37 states have authorized short-term ex parte orders. They
are usually in effect for no more than 10 days if the order is issued without the alleged
offender being present and only the complainant attends." Id.
Some states do issue temporary restraining orders for durations of up to 15 days. See,
e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 1992).
" See infra note 77 (court orders are generally ineffective).
6' Laird, supra note 8. "Technically, victims can apply to civil courts for a restraining
order. But state district Judge Ted Poe calls the process too 'cumbersome' to be effective."
Id.
66 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 211 (1979); Horton, supra note 22
(" '[R]estraining order is a piece of paper, and papers don't stop bullets .... ') (quoting
Sgt. Bob Medkeff, Los Angeles Police Department).
'7 See Peter J. Howe, Court Order Eyed in Slaying; Critics: Restraining Rulings In-
adequate, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1992, at 25 (quoting police officer stating that 24-hour
protection would be "impossible").
68 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 27-31. Buzawa and Buzawa list several
reasons for the "classic" police response to domestic violence. First, police do not believe
that responding to domestic violence calls is "an appropriate police responsibility," because
it does not constitute what is considered a "serious" crime. Second, domestic violence calls
are unproductive in the sense that they decrease the chance an officer will make a substan-
tive felony arrest by using up his time. Third, police mistakenly believe that domestic vio-
lence calls are more violent than other types of calls. On the other hand, they accurately
perceive that few domestic violence cases result in successful prosecution; their work, there-
fore, is ultimately futile. Finally, police share common societal sentiments that domestic
violence and other "private misconduct" should not be subject to public intervention. Id.
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cess of obtaining an injunctive order must be initiated and pursued
by an oftentimes bewildered and harried victim.6 9 Moreover, with
few exceptions, TROs are issued at the court's discretion,70 with no
uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 1 Specifically, there is
disagreement as to when certain relationships between the offender
and victim prohibit the availability of protective orders, the type
of past conduct necessary to make the granting of an order appro-
priate, and the policies to be considered when granting an order. 2
Also, prosecutors and judges, already enormously burdened by the
backlog of more "serious" cases, are reluctant to hear "relation-
ship" cases.7 3 Finally, TROs are of a very short duration, 4 and
sometimes the offender simply waits out the term to begin harass-
ment anew.7 5
The ultimate reason for failure of the injunctive remedy, how-
69 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 117 (claiming victims must initiate and pursue
court orders, often against arcane procedural requirements and indifference of judiciary).
70 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 115.
They [TROs] are not issued as a matter of course, and judges usually require the
prior commission of serious acts of domestic violence prior to issuing an order.
This reluctance is naturally increased when an ex-parte order of the type common
in a TRO is considered. Because such an order significantly restricts a defendant's
liberty and property rights, he is constitutionally protected in his right to due
process from its arbitrary issuance.
Id.
I 71 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 117-18.
72 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 117-18. There are several factors that could
impede the issuance of protective orders.
[1)] Life-styles of the victim/offender often deny the capability of granting an or-
der. Three states do not allow orders to be issued to former spouses; thirteen do
not for people who have never formally married even if "intimates"; ... (Finn,
1989).
[2)] Limits have been placed on the type of past conduct that may be used to
justify the imposition of a restraint. Nine states require proof of actual physical
abuse and refuse to grant protective orders in cases of threats or intimidation.
[3)] Further limitations have often been administratively placed upon ex-parte
TROs-arguably the most important form of protective order given potential for
immediate violence ...
[4)] Numerous procedural limitations exist in many states such as filing fees
(which may however be waived at the discretion of the judge) or an inability of a
victim to obtain an emergency nighttime or weekend order (Finn, 1989).
Id.
73 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 57-58.
74 See supra note 63 (TROs are generally for 10 to 15 days).
75 See Christine Evans, Victims Hope Law Will Stop Stalkers in Their Tracks, MAmI
HERALD, Mar. 16, 1992, at Al (stating stalkers often behave properly until court restraining
orders expire and then resume harassment).
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ever, is its weak deterrent effect.7 '6 In many situations, orders are
useless against a party already considering criminal conduct and
are therefore of limited benefit in preventing unwanted contact. 1
Additionally, violators often receive minimal jail time,78 and crimi-
nal contempt proceedings are not a guaranteed result for violation
of an injunctive order. 9
D. Stalking Legislation-The Solution?
The question logically raised at this point is whether stalking
statutes will represent an improvement over the remedies pres-
ently available. For several reasons the answer seems to be "yes."
First, stalking statutes will be more uniform than existing protec-
tion.80 Second, the statutes will be more effective than restraining
orders because the wide discretion of the police,81 the judiciary, 2
7' See Wainstein, supra note 57, at 736.
Unlike a criminal sentence, an injunction merely threatens criminal or civil penal-
ties in the event of its violation. The charge resulting from the violation of a court
order-contempt of court-does not arise until after the victim has already suf-
fered the feared injury. Thus, when a victim secures an injunction against criminal
conduct after an initial offense, that victim cannot count on deterrent sanctions
until she has suffered a second offense.
Id.
I Wainstein, supra note 57, at 736.
This is especially true when a crime victim seeks to enjoin the perpetrator from
repeating a crime. If the threat of regular criminal sanctions failed to deter the
offender from committing the first violation, there is no reason to think that the
additional possibility of contempt sanctions will deter a second offense.
Id.
I8 See Karen Tumulty & Stephanie Chavez, Domestic Abuse Laws; Victims Find Little
Safety in System, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 1 (stating that even with arrest, violator can
be free in matter of hours).
79 See Wainstein, supra note 57, at 738 (stating that prosecutors and judges are hesi-
tant to bring contempt proceedings after violation of injunctive order); see also Fountain &
Kirby, supra note 17 (citing Illinois State Police report that states 35,346 reported viola-
tions of orders of protection reported in five month period, with almost 8,000 violations in
June alone); Adrian Walker, Third of Court Orders Flouted, Officials Say, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 30, 1992, Metro/Region Section, at 1 (reporting that of 2,000 restraining orders issued
in Massachusetts during first three weeks of state-wide record system, over 700 violations
were reported).
so See Tharp, supra note 16 (contending that stalkers "slip between the cracks of law-
enforcement and mental-health agencies"); cf. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 55, at 117-18
(noting there is wide variation in requirements for court orders).
8' See supra note 68 and accompanying text (claiming law enforcement authorities
have sometimes abused discretion in enforcing court orders).
11 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (suggesting judges given wide discretion in
issuing court orders).
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and the victims themselves"' will be reduced. Third, the stalking
statutes are more comprehensive because they are available to all
victims at all times, regardless of whether the victims qualify for
civil relief8 4 or have the economic resources to pursue protective
orders.s5 Fourth, anti-stalking laws will be more responsive to the
needs of victims by granting protection without requiring a court
appearance."8 Similarly, the statutes will be effective against stalk-
ers whose identities are unknown to victims, whereas civil remedies
totally fail in this regard since the name of the offender is a pre-
requisite to obtaining a protective order.8 7 Finally, stalking stat-
utes will be a greater deterrent. Mere arrest will often dissuade or
reform some offenders, 8 and the prospect of stiffer fines and jail
terms will, in many cases, give the would-be stalker reason to re-
consider his or her planned conduct.89 If unsuccessful as a deter-
rent, the statutes will serve at least to incapacitate the offender
and provide victims some relief from harassment.90
There are compelling arguments, however, that the statutes
will not be effective.9 Why, for example, would new statutes be
enforced by the police and courts when existing statutes are not?92
88 See e.g., Fountain & Kirby, supra note 17 (reporting woman kidnapped after recon-
sidering prosecution of criminal charges, allowing release of boyfriend from jail); cf. Eva J.
Patterson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, in BATrERED WOMEN 79,
86 (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979) (noting one reason why justice system fails is because vic-
tims sometimes drop charges due to intimidation or out of compassion).
8, See supra note 72 and accompanying text (many victims are ineligible for court
orders).
85 See Robinson, supra note 56, at 514 (civil remedies impose cost of initiating litiga-
tion on victim).
88 See supra note 63.
81 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (some stalking victims are unacquainted
with their pursuers).
" See Tumulty & Chavez, supra note 78 ("A good arrest does not have to lead to a
conviction. A good arrest leads to a change in behavior.") (quoting Edmund Stubbing, ex-
New York City police officer who works for Victims Services Agency and organizes seminars
to help set up pro-arrest systems in police departments).
89 Compare infra Table 1 (indicating that stalking violations carry sentences of up to
five years) with Laird, supra note 8 (stating that in Texas most stalker can get is misde-
meanor charge of harassment or terroristic threat, with maximum jail term of 180 days and
$1,500 fine). Texas has since passed a stalking statute. See infra note 172 and accompanying
text.
90 See MIcHAEL D. MALTz, REcIDvsM 11 (1984) (suggesting crime rates could be signifi-
cantly lowered by selectively incapacitating violent and high-rate offenders).
81 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
92 See Kathy Brennan, An Attempt to Stop Violence at the Stalking Stage, PHLA.
DAiLY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1992, Local Section, at 14 (quoting Jake Marcus, Litigation Coordina-
tor for Women Against Abuse in Philadelphia, regarding doubtfulness of effective stalking
1993]
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The statutes will represent another opportunity for unscrupulous
"victims""3 and could possibly be misused by public officials in a
variety of situations.9 4 In many domestic violence cases, they will
exacerbate an already volatile situation and further alienate the of-
fender.95 Considering that the chances of rehabilitation are exceed-
ingly slim,9 6 victims may be at even greater risk upon release of the
criminal.9
Instead of passing new laws, perhaps what is needed is en-
hanced enforcement and strengthening of existing laws. Indeed, it
has been shown that current mechanisms for dealing with abusive
and harassing parties can be made to work. 8 In recent years, a
legislation when assault cases are not resulting in arrests).
Stalking statutes, it is submitted, may further burden the police and the court system.
See Wainstein, supra note 57, at 740 (noting that due to strain on prosecutorial resources
charges are often dropped on less "serious" offenses).
93 See Beck et al., supra note 16 (claiming that stalking laws carry potential for misuse,
particularly in marital disputes); Evans, supra note 75 (referring to Florida's stalking stat-
ute as having potential abuse because it allows arrest based solely on alleged victim's word);
David Heckelman, "Stalking" Legislation Draws Fire over Bond Provision, CHICAGo DAILY
L. BULL., June 2, 1992, at 1 (citing Illinois State Senator's concerns that stalking statutes
could be used by parties to divorce as tool for harassment).
9" See Raoul V. Mowatt, Bill Would Make Stalking of Another Person Illegal, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 24, 1992, at B3; Ross, supra note 8 (stating that stalking laws could be used
against investigative reporters). A deputy director of the ACLU, Susan Frietsche, expressed
reservations about the Pennsylvania stalking statute, stating "you have to be very careful in
writing a criminal statute to be very specific and clear as to what kind of conduct is legal
and what kind is not." Mowatt, supra. "For example," she said, "anti-abortion protesters
often follow women from clinics and try to talk to them. 'You don't want to make it illegal
to walk down the street .... '" Id.
95 See Betsy Q.M. Tong, Harshbarger: Domestic Violence Escalating, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 25, 1992, at 26 (stating that laws designed to stem domestic violence, such as stalking
statute, may increase potential for violence by "upping the ante"); David B. Mitchell, Sym-
posium on Domestic Violence: Arresting the Abuser: Is It Enough, 83 J. CriM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 241, 247 (1992). Unfortunately, there is a growing body of evidence that such arrests
do not necessarily prevent recurrences of abuse. In fact, there is now a feeling that these
arrests may even worsen the situation within some families. As a result, many knowledgea-
ble people are questioning arrest as an exclusive, preferred method for preventing further
violence. Id.
" See MALTz, supra note 90, at 27 (noting that rehabilitation efforts have had little
effect on recidivism).
97 See Beck et al., supra note 16 (stating first person sentenced under California's
stalking statute wandered away from psychiatric facility where he was serving his probation;
he was found waiting outside his victim's health club); Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws
Proliferate: But Critics Say Constitutional Flaws Also Abound, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 35
(stating that jail will not constitute deterrent to stalkers and that upon release they will be
even more angry).
91 See Quincy Court vs. Domestic Criine, supra note 46 (reporting that Quincy District
Court, in Quincy, Massachusetts, implemented successful program for monitoring domestic
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number of police departments have become more effective at deal-
ing with domestic violence by improving policy goals and training
officers in how to handle domestic calls."9 Also, traditional methods
have tighter controls and are less prone to abuse.100
It is submitted that, ideally, there should be both a concerted
effort to enforce existing mechanisms and new legislation to pro-
tect parties who are left vulnerable. Such a comprehensive pro-
gram would result in a two-tier system. First, restraining orders
and injunctive relief can be strictly enforced as a means of preemp-
tive protection. Second, stalking statutes will provide blanket pro-
tection for all members of society.101 Thus, stalking statutes would
be a satisfactory solution to the shortcomings of provisional reme-
dies, by providing more comprehensive and responsive protection,
and by serving as a greater deterrent.
II. QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
1. Background
A widely noted problem with existing stalking legislation is its
potential for unconstitutional vagueness.102 Rooted in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,103 the void-for-vague-
violence).
9, See Kirby, supra note 44. "Among other things, police departments are revising
training procedures, hiring social workers, establishing ties with battered-women's shelters,
and, in some instances, even requiring that an arrest be made in each case of domestic
violence." Id. Police could be trained, it is suggested, to respond in a similar fashion when
dealing with cases of stalkers violating orders of protection.
10o See supra note 70 (discussing court's discretion in issuing restraining orders and
injunctions).
101 See Beck et al., supra note 16 (referring to stalking laws as "one more weapon to
employ against stalkers").
"02 See Ayers, supra note 44 (quoting attorney for American Civil Liberties Union);
Beck et al., supra note 16 (stalking statutes vague, per civil liberties experts); Hall, supra
note 6 (same) (quoting Ephraim Margolin, former president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Attorneys); Toni Locy, Senate Passes Stalking Measure, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 28, 1992, Metro Region, at 22 (reporting that opposition to Massachusetts' stalking bill
was in response to its vagueness); Mowatt, supra note 94 (stating that Pennsylvania's stalk-
ing bill was criticized as vague); see also Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Sept. 3,
1992) (stating that stalking statute vagueness has always been unconstitutional).
103 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964) (stat-
ute struck down because its vagueness violated due process); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S.
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ness doctrine has two primary objectives: 1) to give notice of the
prohibited conduct,10 4 and 2) to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by providing clear guidelines for police,10 5 perhaps the
most important being "the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. '" 10 6
2. Vagueness and the Stalking Statutes
As previously discussed, the definition of stalking is inherently
vague.10 7 Thus, it is necessarily difficult to criminalize without vio-
lating the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The broad language of ex-
isting anti-stalking laws, however, compounds' the problem. The
California statute, which has been used as a model by numerous
states, is instructive.108
284, 293 (1963) (same); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926) (same).
10 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (Statute is unconstitutional if it
fails to give "a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden . . . "). The reasoning behind this holding is that "no man shall be held crimi-
nally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."
Id.; see, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (statute upheld because prior cases
had delineated criminal acts therein); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158
(1972) (holding that loitering ordinance was unconstitutional because it failed to give fair
notice).
105 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 778 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.
1985); Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399 (1966) (announcing that doctrine serves to insure that judges and juries have le-
gally fixed standard of what law prohibits).
IoI Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
2:7 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt. 6 (harassment statute). The same problem oc-
curs in harassment statutes, which likewise deal with a vague subject matter. "Taken to-
gether, these elements of the offense should sufficiently flesh out its meaning to survive
vagueness review. This conclusion is supported by the fact that it is probably impossible to
do any better." Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26-30 (1973)).
108 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1990). The pertinent portion of § 646.9 states:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and, repeatedly follows or harasses an-
other person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person
in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is guilty of the crime of
stalking ....
(d) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys or
harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of con-
duct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emo-
tional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the per-
son. "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of
conduct."
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Several terms of the California statute may lack sufficient clar-
ity either to provide adequate notice or to avoid arbitrary enforce-
ment. The import of "follows," for example, was a concern men-
tioned in the initial California Assembly Reports,109 but no change
was implemented to allay that concern in the final version of the
statute.11 0 In fact, the same term is found in many other statutes,
and in all but one the word is not defined.' Consequently, be-
cause of the many ways in which it is commonly defined, "follows"
is a possible source of vagueness." 2
The term "repeatedly" also raises questions of vagueness. Al-
though its use in a Colorado telephone harassment statute1 ' has
withstood constitutional challenge in the state courts by virtue of
judicial interpretation,1 4 no such saving gloss has been placed
upon the word in other jurisdictions. Unless narrowed by defini-
Id.
log See Hearings on SB 2184 Before the California State Assembly Comm. on Public
Safety, 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1990).
Following. It is not clear what constitutes 'following'. Under the bill, if "A" is
under court order to keep 100 feet away from "X" and witnesses report seeing "A"
following "X" around from a distance of 150 feet, "A" could still be prosecuted
under this bill if "A" had the intent to place "X" in reasonable fear of death or
great bodily injury. Under the bill, a person could still be prosecuted for stalking
even though he or she was not violating any court order.
Id.
Although the Assembly's hypothetical reasonably demonstrates how the statute could
eliminate the need for restraining orders, it does nothing to clarify what is meant by
"following."
10 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1990) (omitting definition of "follows").
"I Wisconsin is the only state to define "follows." See 1992 Wis. A.B. 668, 90th Legis.
Sess., 940.32 (enacted). "'Follow' means to walk or proceed after a person for no legitimate
purpose." Id.
Several states avoid the term "follows" entirely and focus on other types of conduct.
See, e.g., 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292 ("pursues or conducts surveillance"); 1992 Ohio Laws
234 ("engages in a pattern of conduct"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1992) ("engages
in conduct"); see also 1992 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 443 (Baldwin) ("stalks another
person"). In Kentucky, however, the statute states that "to 'stalk' means to engage in an
intentional course of conduct; directed at a specific person or persons; which seriously
alarms, annoys, intimidates, or harasses the person; and which serves no legitimate pur-
pose." Id.
12 Compare WEBsTEs'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTeoNARY 883 (1981) ("follow"
defined as to "move behind over the same path") with id. (also defined as "to watch
steadily").
',' See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111(1)(h) (1992).
11 See People ex rel. Van Meveren v. County of Larimer, 551 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1976).
"'Repeatedly' is a word of such common understanding that its meaning is not vague. It
simply means in the context of this statute that the defendant used insulting, taunting or
challenging language more than one time." Id. at 720.
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tion, the term "repeatedly" may be fertile ground for constitu-
tional challenges."'
The California statute also" 6 employs the terms "annoys" and
"alarms"-both the subject of vagueness challenges in several
states, 17 with varying results."" In many states these words have
not received a settled meaning, and may thus also be subject to
constitutional controversy.
Numerous states, by hastily adopting the California statute
with little or no modification, have adopted these same
problems. 1 9 Other states have been more independent, but in their
desire to draft effective and narrow statutes, they have created
their own quandary of unconstitutional vagueness. Phrases such as
"explicit or implicit threat,' ' 20 "seriously alarm, annoy or har-
115 Several states have provided a specific or minimum number of recurrences that will
trigger the violation of the statute, and thereby circumvented the vagueness problem associ-
ated with the subjective term "repeatedly." In Illinois, the perpetrator must either follow
the victim or place her under surveillance by remaining present outside her home or place of
work on at least two separate occasions. 1992 Ill. Laws 871. Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, North
Carolina, and Virginia each require that the stalking occur "on more than one occasion."
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West 1992) (" 'repeatedly' means on more than one
occasion"); 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292 (stalking must occur on more than one occasion); 1992
Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2025 (West) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1992) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1992) (same). Kentucky supplies the quantity necessary by
defining "course of conduct" as "a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts, evi-
dencing a continuity of purpose." 1992 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 443 § 508.130
(Baldwin).
li6 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (Deering 1992). This section of the statute is
taken directly from the California Code of Civil Procedure section granting temporary re-
straining orders and injunctions for harassment.
117 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (statute upheld); Bolles v.
People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (holding statute unconstitutional); People v. Klick, 362
N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1977) (upholding statute constitutional); State v. Jaeger, 249 N.W.2d 688
(Iowa 1977) (ruling statute constitutional); Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306 (Md. 1978)
(same); State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (holding statute
constitutional).
11 Compare Colorado v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1988) (holding that because of
narrowing standards, presence of words "annoy" and "alarm," by themselves, is insufficient
to render statute unconstitutionally vague) with City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (finding law barring conduct that "alarms or seriously annoys" void
for vagueness). "Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordi-
nance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard
of conduct is specified at all." Id. at 619.
19 See infra note 146 (listing states with stalking statutes similar to California's); see
also infra Table 1 (complete listing of all states with stalking statutes; comparison of crime
elements).
120 See 1992 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 443 § 508.10 (Baldwin). "A person is guilty of
stalking in the first degree when he intentionally: 1. stalks another person; and 2. makes an
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ass," '121 "intentionally and closely follows,' ' 2 2 and "lies in wait"'23
have been employed in several statutes without sufficient defini-
tion or clarity. It is likely that these statutes fall both prongs of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, but are especially susceptible to arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.
3. Possible Solutions
There are certain techniques that can be used by lawmakers
and the judiciary to help avoid the potential for unconstitutional
vagueness. For instance, a scienter element might mitigate against
vagueness, 24 or a term could be narrowed by a judicial interpreta-
tion.125 In addition, a seemingly vague statutory term can take its
meaning from other legislation, 26 or from its use at common
law. 27
Doctrinally, every statute has a strong presumption of consti-
explicit or implicit threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of: a. sexual
contact as defined in KRS 510.010; b. serious physical injury; or c. death." Id.
121 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1992). "A person commits the offense of stalking who
.o. intentionally commits a series of ... acts ... to seriously alarm, annoy or harass a
specific person ..... Id.
122 IV. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992).
123 See id.; 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237 HB 5882 (Reg. Sess.).
124 See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (hold-
ing that, because of implied scienter requirement, ordinance restricting sale of drug para-
phernalia was not vague); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (lack of
specific intent assisted in rendering statute vague); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945) (specific intent element counters vagueness challenges).
The concept of a saving scienter element is based upon the notion that "a person al-
ready bent on serious wrongdoing has less need for notice and that a citizen who refrains
from acting with morally bad intent is not endangered by the statutory sanction." Royall,
supra note 35, at 1409 (quoting Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Stat-
utes, 62 HARv. L. REV. 77, 85 (1948)).
125 See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-73 (1977) (holding that prior rulings on stat-
ute reached defendant's conduct); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 100 ("Only if no construction
can save the Act from this claim of unconstitutionality are we willing to reach that result.").
126 See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (defining "scienter" from other New
York statutes); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (defining "moral turpitude" from
laws governing disbarment of attorneys, revocation of medical licenses, and crimes involving
fraud); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) (defining word "range" by reference to
its usual and customary meaning is not due process violation).
227 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1926) (stating that prior
case law did not provide sufficient common-law definition for "locality"); International Har-
vester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1914) (finding that "real value" had been
defined in previous cases as "market value under fair competition, and under normal market
conditions"); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (punishing conspiracies on
common-law footing by imposing liability for act of conspiring without requiring anything
more).
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tutionality that can only be overcome with proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.2 s Due process considerations permit statutory language
to be sufficiently general so that the statute may be applied to a
variety of situations,' 29 and when dealing with subject matter that
does not allow for more definite statutory guidelines, uncertain
language is given the benefit of the doubt.13 0 Nevertheless, the ob-
lique subject matter of stalking legislation lends itself to constitu-
tional difficulty.''
B. Other Constitutional Concerns
There are also concerns that stalking legislation may be
abused to deprive accused stalkers of their rights. Florida's statute,
for example, allows a police officer to make an arrest without a
warrant as long as probable cause exists 3 2 and would permit an
arrest for "aggravated stalking"'1 3 based solely on information sup-
plied by the victim. This provision raises Fourth Amendment is-
sues13 4 and may lead to abuse by giving vindictive parties the
power to have their mates arrested.13 5
The statutes of Illinois, Ohio, and Iowa each grant courts the
power to deny bail to a stalking suspect. 36 While these mecha-
128 See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
129 See Nash, 229 U.S. at 377 (Holmes, J.)("[L]aw is full of instances where a man's
fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . ").
1"I See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that statute prohibiting
broadcaster from employing "persons in excess of the number of employees needed," was
worded with as much exactness as possible).
131 See Resnick, supra note 34 at 27 ("[B]y writing a statute which is unconstitutional,
they are ensuring that any stalker convicted under the statute will ultimately go free.")
(quoting Jeffrey S. Weiner, president of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
speaking in reference to Florida statute).
132 See 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-208. "Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of
this section." Id.
133 See id. § 784.048(3). Aggravated stalking is a third degree felony, punishable by
imprisonment for up to five years and a $5,000 fine. Id.
134 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court has held that the police,
through the warrant procedure, must obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures whenever practicable. Id. at 20; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
135 See Beck et al., supra note 16 (Florida stalking statute carries potential for misuse
because of high incident of false allegations against current or former spouses) (citing Miami
criminal defense lawyer Jeffrey Weiner).
126 See 1992 Ill. Laws 871. The Illinois statute lists eight factors to be considered by the
court: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the
offender; the nature of the threat; any statements made by the defendant; the age and phys-
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nisms are aimed at protecting victims, they also provide conven-
ient avenues for misuse137 and raise important Eighth Amendment
and state constitutional issues.138
Fifteen statutes make exceptions for "constitutionally pro-
tected activities,"1 39 and nine exclude "conduct which occurs dur-
ing labor picketing." 140 Several statutes, however, possess neither
of these protections.1 41 The omission of such exceptions raises the
ical condition of any person assaulted by the accused; whether he possesses or has access to
weapons; whether he was on parole or probation at the time of the offense; and "any other
factors... deemed by the court to have reasonable bearing upon the defendant's propensity
or reputation for violent, abusive or assaultive behavior, or lack of that behavior." Id. The
release of the defendant may be denied if the defendant "poses a real and present threat to
the physical safety of the alleged victim." Id. This portion of the Illinois statute has drawn
heated criticism for being violative of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. See
Collins, infra note 138; Heckelman, supra note 93.
Ohio's statute lists five factors: whether the offender has a history of violence towards
the victim; the mental health of the offender; whether the person has a history of violating
court orders; whether the offender is a potential threat to any other person; and whether
setting bail at a high level will interfere with any treatment or counseling that the person is
undergoing. 1992 Ohio Laws 234.
In Iowa, there is a presumption of ineligibility for bail after the second offense. 1992
Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2025 (West).
137 See Beck et al., supra note 16 ("Some civil-liberties experts argue that the new laws
are overly vague and carry a potential for misuse, particularly in marital disputes.").
138 See Joseph V. Collina, Stalking Law Is Bad Legislation, Unneeded and Unconsti-
tutional, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 31, 1992, at 5 (stating that United States and Illinois
Constitutions both forbid holding persons without bail, except in capital offenses).
'39 See 1992 Ala. Acts 92-675 (constitutionally protected activity is not included in defi-
nition of "harasses"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992) (constitutionally
protected activity is not included within meaning of "course of conduct"); 1992 Fla. Laws
ch. 92-208 (listing picketing and other organized protests as constitutionally protected activ-
ities); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1992) (constitutionally protected activity is not included
within meaning of "course of conduct"); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (same); 1992 Ky. Rev.
Stat. & R. Serv. 443 (Baldwin) ("Constitutionally-protected activity is not included within
meaning of 'course of conduct.' If the defendant claims that he was engaged in constitution-
ally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of that claim as a matter of law
and, if found valid, shall exclude that activity from evidence."); 1992 La. Acts 80 (constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within meaning of "course of conduct"); 1992
Miss. Laws 532 (same); 1992 Neb. Laws 1098 (same); 1992 N.J. S.B. 256, 205th Legis., 1st
Reg. Sess. (enacted); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 1993) (same); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws
ch. 92-201 (same); 1992 S.C. Acts 417 (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-5 (1992)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1992) (same).
110 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-208
(includes picketing or other organized protests); 1992 IMI. Laws. 871 (picketing occurring at
workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of bona fide labor dispute); 1992 Kan. Sess.
Laws 298; 1992 Neb. Laws 1098; 1992 N.J. S.B. 256, 205th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (enacted);
1992 S.C. Acts 417 HB 4086; 1992 Wis. A.B. 688, 90th Legis. Sess. (enacted).
141 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237 (Reg.
Sess.); 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292; 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2025 (West); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. 1992); 1992 N.Y. Laws 345; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3
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specter of stalking laws as tools for interfering with legal demon-
strations, 42 private investigations, 43 or proper, albeit overzealous,
journalistic tactics.'
III. QUESTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS
Aside from policy debates over the need for anti-stalking laws
and their constitutionality, the effectiveness of the specific statutes
in curbing the stalking problem is at issue. This section will discuss
the three main categories of stalking statutes and also delve into
some of the specific features of several statutes.
A. General Categories
While there are some differences among the anti-stalking laws,
most bear a resemblance to the first anti-stalking statute, enacted
in California in 1990.1'" What distinguishes the California statute,
and its numerous imitators, 46 is the threat requirement; specifi-
cally, a "credible threat"'147 or some lesser threat 148 is required for
(1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1992); W.
VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992); 1992 Wis. A.B. 668, 90th Legis. Sess. (enacted).
142 See Mowatt, supra note 94 (suggesting stalking laws could be used against anti-
abortion protesters).
143 See CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON SB 2184, April 24,
1990 (raising concern that statute could be used against private investigators, insurance ad-
justers, law enforcement officers, repossessors, and newspaper reporters).
144 See Ross, supra note 8 (quoting Loren Siegel, director of public education for Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992); Resnick, supra note 34 (stating that
California enacted first stalking statute in 1990 following murders of five women by ex-
husbands or boyfriends).
14 See 1992 Ala. Acts 92-675; 1993 Ark. Acts 379; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111
(West 1992); 1992 Ill. Laws 871; 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2025 (West); 1992 Ky. Rev.
Stat. & R. Serv. ch.443 (Baldwin); 1992 La. Acts 80; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law.
Co-op. 1992); 1992 Neb. Laws 1098; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 1993); 1992 R.I. Pub.
Laws 92-201; 1992 S.C. Acts 417; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-315 (1992); 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 10 (Vernon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5
(1992); 1992 Wis. A.B. 688, 90th Legis. Sess. (enacted). Each of these statutes is virtually
identical to California's.
147 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992). The California Code defines a "credible
threat" as "a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so
as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety
.... The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause great bodily injury to, a
person.. . ." Id. Similar language is used in all "threat" states except for those listed infra
note 148.
148 Illinois, Massachusetts, and Tennessee all use the bare term "threat" in their stat-
utes, while Kentucky uses the phrase "explicit or implicit threat." See supra note 146, for
citations to each statute. The Arkansas statute employs the term "terroristic threat." See
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the law to be violated. This requirement severely limits the scope
and applicability of the statute149-solely following or harassing a
victim is not a violation. The effectiveness of such a narrowly
drafted statute is questionable. 15 Although probably intended as a
means for limiting abuse, this component provides criminals with a
loophole through which to avoid punishment.' 51
The second category of stalking statutes is roughly based on
the California statute, but much broader in scope. These statutes,
adopted in ten states,15 2 close the loophole created by the credible
threat element by either making a threat a separate act punishable
under the statute53 or by defining the actus reus as a "course" or
"pattern" of conduct.15 4 This type of stalking statute not only cor-
1993 Ark. Act 379.
"9 See Interview with Dietz, supra note 19. Dr. Parker Dietz, in an interview with the
author, expressed his reservations about the "credible threat" requirement of the statutes.
An overt threat should not be an element, according to Dr. Dietz, because it does not pre-
cede many of the more serious consequences of stalking. "If you wait for the threat you will
have failed most of the time." Id. It is submitted that although a "threat" statute will pro-
vide some protection in cases of domestic violence, or in cases in which an abusive or violent
perpetrator is familiar with the victim, the limiting language will prevent convictions of
obsessive or psychotic stalkers who have little or no communication with their victims. The
statutes will also exclude parties who are familiar with the legal elements of the crime and
refrain from communicating any threat. Cf. Ross, supra note 8 ("Many of these guys know
what the definition of domestic violence is and officially avoid it . . . ") (quoting Joan
Zorza, attorney for National Battered Women's Law Project in New York).
190 Telephone Interview with Lt. John C. Lane, Los Angeles Police Department Threat
Management Unit (Oct. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Lane Interview]. Lt. Lane stated that in
many cases the suspect never overtly communicates a threat. Id.; see also Horton, supra
note 22 (stating that law would not be helpful in cases in which overt threat is absent).
There have been attempts to change this portion of the California law. Lt. Lane stated
that he has lobbied to eliminate the "credible threat" element and to replace it with a "rea-
sonable threat" standard. Lane Interview, supra.
"I Despite its flaws, the California statute has been successful in putting stalkers be-
hind bars. California courts have already handed down several convictions for violations of
section 646.9. The California Attorney General Law Enforcement Division reports that the
state does not track misdemeanor convictions of stalking. As of October 1992, however,
there have been three recorded convictions for felony stalking. Telephone Interview with
Charlotte Rhea, Office of Statistics, California Attorney General's Office (Oct. 15, 1992).
"2' See 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 97 (West); 1993 Md. Laws Ch.
206; MIcH. CoMaP. LAws ANN. § 750.411 h & i (West 1993); 1992 Miss. Laws ch. 532; 1992
N.Y. Laws 345; 1992 Ohio Laws 234; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-2-9a (1992); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 92.
"I See, e.g., 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992). The stalking statute of Delaware is typical: "Any
person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person or who
repeatedly makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of
death or serious physical injury is guilty of the crime of stalking." Id.
I See, e.g., 1992 N.Y. Laws 345. New York's law is part of the N.Y. Penal Code's
menacing section and reads as follows:
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rects the shortcomings of the California statute, but also enlarges
the scope of enforcement to include conduct that would not gener-
ally be defined as "pursuing" or "following.' 1 55 Of all the statutes
passed thus far, this group will likely be the most effective and far-
reaching; unfortunately, they will also be subject to the most criti-
cism with respect to intrusiveness and overbreadth. 15e
The final group can be characterized as "pure" stalking stat-
utes. These laws do not require a credible threat and are limited to
conduct in which the offender repeatedly "follows" the victim. 57
These statutes specifically address the prohibited conduct without
requiring an additional element that limits the statute and without
extending the statute's reach into conduct that is constitutionally
protected.'58 There are eleven "pure" statutes,15 and it is submit-
ted that they represent the optimum balance between defendants'
civil rights and victims' rights.
A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when... 2. He or she repeat-
edly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts
over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person
in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death.
Id.
155 See supra note 112 (defining "following" as to "move behind over the same path").
156 The doctrine of overbreadth is designed to guard against laws that interfere with
activities protected by the First Amendment. This doctrine is not without limitations. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The Supreme Court, in Broadrick, explained
that the concept of "substantial" overbreadth is the test applicable in cases in which speech
is joined with conduct.
[The function of the overbreadth doctrine is] a limited one at the outset, [and]
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanc-
tion moves from "pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct-even if expres-
sive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate
state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitution-
ally unprotected conduct.
Id. at 615. Consequently, the doctrine has little relevancy to stalking legislation, in which
conduct, not speech, is the central focus. However, with implementation of a "threat" as a
separate ground for violating the statute, the law moves closer towards pure speech and
therefore, the possibility of overbreadth.
5I See, e.g., 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 92-237 (Reg. Sess.). "A person is guilty of stalking in
the second degree when, with intent to cause another person to fear for his physical safety,
he wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and causes such other
person to reasonably fear for his physical safety." Id.
:as See infra note 159.
169 See 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 92-237 (Reg. Sess.); 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-208; 1993 Ga.
Laws 560; 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1992); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws
298; 1993 Mont. Laws 292; 1992 N.J. S.B. 256, 205th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (enacted); 1993
N.M. Laws 86; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1992); 1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. 186 (West).
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B. Special Provisions
Several states have included provisions that expressly protect
certain types of victims. Alabama,160 Arkansas,' 61 California,6 2
Georgia,'63  Idaho,6'6  Oklahoma,' 65 Texas, 66 Utah,' ' and Wyo-
ming" 8 proscribe stalking or threatening members of the victim's
immediate family, which prevents stalkers from attacking their
victims through intimidation or harassment of family members.
The Connecticut statute contains an enhancement that automati-
cally raises the offense of stalking from a misdemeanor to a felony
when the victim is under sixteen years of age.'6 9
Other states have focused more on the stalker and his or her
state of mind. Eight statutes broaden or eliminate entirely the
mens rea requirement.170 These statutes allow convictions of stalk-
ers who, because of mental disease or incapacity, lack the specific
intent required by many statutes.
At the other extreme, several states have enacted severely lim-
ited stalking statutes that will likely be ineffective. Nebraska's
statute, for instance, requires that the perpetrator violate an in-
junction, restraining order, protection order, or no-contact order
before criminal liability arises.17' The Texas stalking statute,
signed by Governor Richards in March of 1993, requires annoying
or harassing conduct, a threat and that the conduct occur after the
victim has previously reported the perpetrator to the police.' 72 One
See 1992 Ala. Acts 92-675.
, See 1993 Ark. Acts 379.
162 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992).
161 See 1993 Ga. Laws 560.
164 See IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1992).
161 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 1993).
166 See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 10 (Vernon).
167 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1992).
166 See 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 92.
119 See 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 92-237 (Reg. Sess.).
170 See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West 1992) (no intent necessary); 1992 Haw.
Sess. Laws 292 (in reckless disregard of risk of harassing, annoying or alarming another);
IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1992) (no intent necessary); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (no intent
necessary); 1992 Ohio Laws 234 (knowingly causes another to believe that physical harm or
mental distress will result); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1992) (knowing that reasonable
person would suffer emotional distress); 1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. 186 (West) (knows or rea-
sonably should know that victim is afraid); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 92 (same). Most of the
remaining statutes require a minimum mens rea element of "intent to place in reasonable
fear of death or bodily injury." See infra Table 1.
'71 See 1992 Neb. Laws 1098.
'72 See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 10 (Vernon).
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of the most narrowly written statutes is West Virginia's,7 3 which
states that the victim must have resided with, cohabited with, or
engaged in sexual or intimate contact with the perpetrator. 17 4
There is also a wide divergence in the penalties prescribed by
the different states. 75 Nearly all make the first offense a misde-
meanor and employ escalating sentences or felony charges for re-
peat offenders and for those violating court orders.18 In most anti-
stalking laws the penalty for the first conviction is a misdemeanor
carrying a maximum sentence of either six months or one year;177
second convictions are generally felonies if committed within a
specified period of time, generally five to ten years.178 The states
are, however, evenly split between felony and misdemeanor treat-
ment of those convicted of violating restraining orders or
injunctions. 179
Both Michigan'8s and Wyoming'8 ' employ an innovative rem-
edy; the victim is allowed to pursue a civil action against the
stalker. A successful plaintiff can recover punitive damages, costs,
and attorney's fees, regardless of whether the defendant has been
convicted or charged with criminal stalking.182
In the final analysis, the anti-stalking statutes will generally
close the interstices in the law which have allowed stalkers to pur-
sue their victims. However, there are significant disparities be-
171 See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992).
274 Id.
175 See Table 1 (displaying various degrees of penalties).
178 See id. Exceptions include Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey, which provide for first offense felony counts, stiffer penalties, and minimum sentenc-
ing. See 1993 Ark. Acts 379; 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. 871 (West); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. 1992); 1992 N.J. S.B. 256, 205th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess.
(enacted). The New Mexico statute differs from the norm in that it classifies the second
offense as a misdemeanor and withholds felony classification until the third conviction. See
1993 N.M. Laws 86.
177 See infra Table 1.
178 Id. Several states also omit the requirement that the second offense occur within a
certain amount of time from the first. See id. (Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Washington each leave open time period for second offense).
178 See id. There is also a wide variance from state to state as to the penalties imposed
for stalking in violation of a provisional remedy. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West
1992) (charging stalker with misdemeanor carrying prison term of not more than one year
and fine of not more than $1,000, or both, but with option of serving sentence in state
facility) with 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-208 (charging stalker with aggravated stalking, third
degree felony, carrying maximum five year sentence).
18o See MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2954 (West 1993).
181 See 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 92.
182 See id.; MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2954 (West 1993).
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tween the statutes from state to state, and the effectiveness of the
statutes will differ accordingly. 183 The California statute and its
progeny are the most narrowly written statutes and as a result will
be less effective in controlling stalking. But statutes that define the
stalking actus reus as a "course or conduct" or "credible threat," as
opposed to "following," may be overly broad and, consequently,
encounter applicational or constitutional problems. The "pure"
statutes are perhaps the best compromise because they do not con-
tain constricting elements that render the statute ineffective or so
loosely focus on the problem conduct that they create constitu-
tional problems.
IV. PROPOSED STALKING STATUTE
The following proposed statute, developed by the author, in-
corporates various elements found in existing stalking statutes:
a. Definitions
1. "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and
the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his
or her safety or for the safety of a member of his or her imme-
diate family.
2. "Follows" means to pursue or travel along the same path
while maintaining, or attempting to maintain, visual contact.
3. "Harasses" means a pattern of conduct, purposely commit-
ted, comprising two or more acts evidencing a continuity of
purpose, directed at a specific person, which reasonably causes
substantial emotional distress to the person.
4. "Knowingly" means that the offender is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
5. "Member of the immediate family" means any spouse, par-
ent, child, sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in
the household of that person.
6. "Purposely" means that it is the offender's conscious object
83 See infra Table 1. Besides those enumerated, there are a number of other differ-
ences in the statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1992). North Carolina's statute
requires that a potential victim make a "reasonable warning or request to desist." Id. On the
other hand, the statutes of Hawaii, Utah, and Washington all contain provisions that extend
the statute to cover instances in which the victim, in addition to being stalked or harassed,
reasonably believes or fears that the stalker intends to injure the property of the victim or
of another person. See 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1992);
1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. 186 (West).
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to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result as
is specified as an element.
b. Stalking in the Fourth Degree.-Any person who purposely fol-
lows or harasses another person on more than one occasion, and
knowingly places that person in reasonable fear of physical harm,
is guilty of the crime of stalking in the fourth degree, a misde-
meanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months,
or by a fine of not more than $500, or both.
c. Stalking in the Third Degree.-Any person who purposely fol-
lows or harasses another person on more than one occasion, with
the intent of placing that person in reasonable fear of physical
harm, or any person who violates subsection (b) and there exists
one or more of the enhancers listed in subsection (f), is guilty of
the crime of stalking in the third degree, a misdemeanor punisha-
ble by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not
more than $1000, or both.
d. Stalking in the Second Degree.-Any person who purposely fol-
lows or harasses another person on more than one occasion, and
who makes a credible threat with the intent of placing that person
in reasonable fear of physical harm, or any person who violates
subsection (c) and there exists one or more of the enhancers listed
in subsection (f), is guilty of the crime of stalking in the second
degree, a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term not less
than one year and not more than three years, or by a fine of not
more than $3000, or both.
e. Stalking in the First Degree.-Any person who violates subsec-
tion (d) and there exists one or more of the enhancers listed in
subsection (f), is guilty of the crime of stalking in the first degree,
a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term not less than three
years and not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than
$5000, or both.
f. The enhancers for the purposes of this section are as follows:
1. the defendant has previously pleaded guilty to or has been
convicted of stalking; or
2. in committing the offense, the defendant violated a court
order of protection, a temporary restraining order, or an in-
junction; or
3. the intended victim was, at the time of the offense, under
eighteen years of age; or
4. the defendant was, at the time of the offense, in possession
of a dangerous weapon, as defined by other sections of the pe-
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nal law.
g. Severability.-The provisions of this article shall be severable,
and if any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, or part of this
article shall be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to
be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the
remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the
clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, or part thereof directly
involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have
been rendered.
This proposed statute is intended to cover the widest variety
of stalking situations, yet remain within constitutional parameters.
After the definitions in subdivision (a), subdivision (b) establishes
the threshold offense as following or harassing with knowledge of
the victim's fear. The most important distinction between this and
most of the statutes passed to date is the absence of the "threat"
element, which severely limited the scope of those statutes. 18 4 The
statute also contains several elements that are broader than those
employed in most of the statutes passed to date."8 5 But, in general,
the terms are narrowly defined, eliminating vagueness problems"8 "
and restricting the opportunity for abuse by utilizing words that
have less ambiguous meanings. 18
7
18 See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text (positing that California's statute
and those closely modelled after it are overly narrow).
"' The component "knowingly placing in reasonable fear" lessens the rigors of the "in-
tent" requirement of many of the statutes, and thus broadens the scope of the statute. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (suggesting that narrow specific intent elements
exclude many stalkers). At the same time, the scienter element gives fair warning, strength-
ening the statute against any constitutional challenge of vagueness.
"Knowingly," as defined by the proposed statute, is subjective and would require actual
knowledge that the conduct was causing reasonable fear. In the alternative, the definition
could be broadened by-an objective definition such as "knows or should have known," The
subjective form was used because of its greater element of notice, making the statute less
vague. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
The element describing the result of the offender's actions, "fear of physical harm," is
also wider in scope than the more commonly used "fear of death or serious physical injury."
See supra note 153.
186 See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness of many stalk-
ing statutes).
187 See supra notes 109-12 (defining "follows"). "Follows" although inherently vague, is
defined by words that have precise and well-settled meanings. See id.
Specific quantities are also designated in the statute, avoiding the arbitrariness innate
in the word "repeatedly." See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (asserting that
"repeatedly" could be unconstitutionally vague term). Words that have raised constitutional
problems in the past, such as "annoy" and "alarm," have also been intentionally avoided.
See supra notes 117-18 ("annoy" and "alarm" have previously been grounds for vagueness).
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Subdivision (c) describes a more egregious form of conduct,
stalking with intent to cause fear, and consequently carries a stiffer
sentence. Procedurally, subdivision (c) is also the lowest offense
with an enhancing element present, and this element is included in
the remaining sections. 88 The definition of stalking is narroived
again and the penalties increased in subsection (d), which is sub-
stantially similar to the California statute, 89 and again in (e), the
highest grade of stalking. 90
The proposed statute covers threats directed to family mem-
bers, '9 which is a feature in several statutes.9 2 Finally, the statute
contains a severability clause that should help guarantee the sur-
vival of the statute in the event of a successful constitutional chal-
lenge to one or more of its sections. 193
188 Several variations of the enhancement methodology used in the model are possible.
Other possibilities include that the defendant is on parole, probation, or under a separate
investigation for a crime involving the present victim, or that the defendant has crossed
state lines or traveled more than a specified distance in stalking the victim.
The most common enhancements-a violation of a court order and the previous convic-
tion for stalking the same victim-pose special concerns. In the above model statute, their
presence increases the severity of the violation by one degree. However, in the interest of
justice and in order to provide better protection for victims, the option of including even
stronger penalties should be explored. Arguably, a stiff minimum sentence for a violation of
a court order or a previous conviction is warranted; the defendant has clearly demonstrated
his intention to interfere with another's life and refuses to abate such conduct. A second
offense of stalking in the fourth degree may merit more than a one year sentence. A classifi-
cation of a felony offense for the presence of either of these two enhancers should be
considered.
An alternate method of handling the enhancement section is to assign an additional
penalty to each and then make the penalties cumulative. For instance, one year could be
added for each of the enhancements present. Under this alternate approach, the conviction
for stalking in the fourth degree, with the enhancements of a violated court order, a re-
peated conviction, and the possession of a weapon, would carry a maximum sentence of
three and one-half years. Under the system initially described above, the sentence is only
one year.
18 See supra note 110.
190 Subsection (e) is the functional equivalent of a higher grade violation of several stat-
utes. See, e.g., 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 92-237 (Reg. Sess.) (defining stalking in first degree,
felony offense, as when person commits stalking in second degree and (1) he has previously
been convicted of stalking, or (2) he violates court order, or (3) victim is under sixteen
years).
1"1 See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. The scope of the statute can be
broadened beyond "immediate family." See 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 292 (reasonable belief
that offender intends to cause bodily injury or property damage to victim or to another).
192 See 1992 Ala. Acts 92-675; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-
7905 (1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1992);
infra Table 1.
193 As of July 1993, only one state has included a severability provision, Alabama. See
1992 Ala. Acts 92-675.
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CONCLUSION
Anti-stalking legislation is a pragmatic, even necessary, step in
the battle against violence in American society. Thousands of peo-
ple are subjected to this type of harassing conduct every year, yet
the legal system has been, for the most part, unable to provide an
adequate response. Although stalking laws are capable of mitigat-
ing this deficiency, the statutes passed thus far are a far cry from
ideal. Many are too narrow, and most may be subject to some type
of constitutional challenge. A better solution is possible. By care-
fully examining the problem and exploring the available options,
balanced, more inclusive laws, such as the proposed statute con-
tained herein, may be created.
Richard A. Lingg
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TABLE 1 - STALKING STATUTES
State-by-State Comparison
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1. This statute is significantly different from other statutes and does not fit within categories listed. 2.
Also requires some type of restraining order against the accused. 3. Victim must have formerly cohabited
or had a sexual relation with the accused.
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TABLE 1 - STALKING STATUTES
State-by-State Comparison
perceived result exceptions sentenc
6 4 y *
s ,A
ing4
in violation of a
AL * * * 1 yr. & $5000 2 yrs. & $10,000
AR * *3 yrs. 5 yrs. 10 5 yrs.
CA 1 ____ Iyr.&$1000 lyr. & $1000 7 1 yr. & $1000
CO * 6 mos. & S750 - 2 yrs. & $5000
CT * yr.&$1000 yrs. 5 yrs.
DE * I lyr. & $I000 1 yr. & $1000 7 6 mos. & S100
FL * * I yr. & $1000 5 yrs. & $5000
GA yr. & $1000 Ito5yrs. 5 yrs. & $10,000
HI * *30 days&$500 1 yr.&$1000
ID * 1yr. & $1000 yrs.&$5000 7 1 yr. & $1000
IL * * * 1to 3 yrs. 2to5yrs. 2 to 5 yrs.
IN ,ndn'. sriatrv * 6 mos. & S1000 2 yrs. & $10,000 1 yr. & $5000
IA * 30 days & $100 2 yrs. & S5000 1 yr.-& $1000
KS * 6 mos. & $1000 1 yr. & $2500 7 1 yr. & $2500
KY * 1 yr. & $500 5 yrs. & $1000 5 5 yrs. & $1000
LA * * Gmos. & $1000 2 yrs. & $5000 7 1 yr. & $5000
MD * 5 yrs. & $5000
MA * -30 mos. & $1000 2 to 10 yrs. - yrs.&$1000
terrn rgted
MI *numidaled. rr!ntd 1 yr. & S1000 5 yrs. & $10,000 - 5 yrs. & $10,000
MS * * Gmos. & S1000 2 yrs. & $2000 7 1 yr. & $1000
MT * 1 yr. & $1000 5 yrs. & $10,000 - 5 yrs. & S10,000
NE * * * 1 yr. & $10,000 5 yrs. & $10,000 7
NJ * 18 mos. & $7500 5 yrs. & $7500 w 5 yrs. & $7500
NM * * 1yr. & $1000 72 hoursP
NY * I yr. & $1000
NC * 6 mos. & $1000 2 yrs. & $2000 5 2 yrs. & S2000
OH * 6 mos. & SI000 18 mos. & S2500
OK * I yr. & 81000 5 yrs.& $2500 10 5 yrs. & $2500
RI * I yr. & $3000 5 yrs.& $10,000 7 2 yrs. & $6000
SC * * yr. & 81000 3 yrs.& $2000 7 2 yrs. & $I000
SD * I yr. & 1000 2 yrs. & S2000 7 1 yr. & $1000
TN * I yr. & $2500 6 yrs.& 3000 7 6 yrs. & $3000
TX * * lyr. & $2000 2 yrs.& $5000
UT * * 6 mos. & $1000
VA * Gmos. & $1000 1 yr. & $2500 57 1 yr. & $2500
WA * 1 yr. & $1000 5 yrs. & $10000 - 5 yrs. & S10,000
WV * 6 mos. & 81000 1 yr. & $1000
WI * * 9mos. & 1000 2 yrs. 7 2 yrs.
WYS * * Gmos. & $750 10 yrs. 5 10 yrs.-
4. States which have no separate category for second offense or in violation of a court order have blank
space under those headings. Dash for time period of second offense indicates that state observes no time
limit. 5. Provides the victim a civil cause of action against the stalker. 6. Mandatory minimum sentence.
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